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Abstract:  
We incorporate normative motivations into the economic model of accidents and tort 
rules. The social norm is that one should avoid harming others and should compensate 
if nevertheless harm is caused. To some extent, this is internalized through intrinsic 
moral concerns; moreover, those thought not to adhere to the norm are met with social 
disapproval. Moral and reputational concerns are not strong enough, however, for 
injurers to willingly compensate their victims. Absent legal liability, normative concerns 
induce precautions to prevent harm but precautions are then socially inefficient. By 
contrast, perfectly enforced legal liability crowds out informal incentives completely (e.g., 
individuals causing harm suffer no stigma) but precautions are then socially efficient. 
Under imperfectly enforced legal liability, formal legal sanctions and normative concerns 
are complements and interact to induce more precautions than under no-liability. 
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1 Introduction
Legal liability induces precautions to prevent accidental harm to third parties.
In the economic model of tort rules, incentives to exercise care are purely
externaland reduce to the implicit pricesset by legal sanctions.1 Casual
observation suggests that other motivations are usually also at work. Most
people exercise some care out of moral considerations. As noted by Shavell
(2004): There are two fundamental reasons why individuals will often want
to obey moral notions... One is that individuals have internal incentives to
do so, namely, they feel virtuous if they adhere to them, and experience
guilt if they do not. Second, individuals have external incentives to obey
moral notions in that they will be praised by others for that behavior and
admonished, scold, or otherwise punished for immoral behavior. In this
paper, we incorporate moral concerns into the economic model of accidents
and legal liability.
Other-regarding motivations, normative incentives and the like come in
many forms. The recent economic literature, not to mention psychology or
sociology, o¤ers an abundant menu of notions: altruism and warm glow, sta-
tus, fairness, inequity aversion, esteem and self-esteem, reciprocity, aversion
to norm-breaking, to name only a few.2 We consider the role of a social
or moral norm that is particularly relevant in a tort context. Kaplow and
Shavell (2002) remark that there is a strong social norm to avoid harming
others and to compensate for the harm that one does cause. We take the
existence of such a norm as given. Individuals feel guilt when they do not
abide by it, but some individuals are intrinsically more morally concerned
than others. Moreover, individuals earn social esteem if they are thought to
have high moral concerns and su¤er social disapproval if not.
The natural question is then how normative incentives interact with for-
mal legal sanctions to inuence behavior (see Posner, 2000, Kaplow and
1The basic model is due to Brown (1973) and has been developed, in particular, in
Landes and Posner (1987) and Shavell (1987).
2See for instance Andreoni (1989, 1990), Glazer and Konrad (1996), Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), Brennan and Pettit (2005), Bénabou and Tirole (2003, 2006), Frey (1997), Rabin
(1993), Lopez-Perez (2008).
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Shavell, 2007, and for a recent survey McAdams and Rasmusen, 2007). The
issue is often formulated in terms of whether law and normative incentives are
substitutes or complements.3 On a more general level, the recent literature
on informal incentives has much emphasized the possibility that extrinsic in-
centives crowd out intrinsic motivations (see the survey by Frey and Jegen,
2001). We contribute to this debate by discussing a framework with the fol-
lowing properties. First, there is a well dened notion of what constitutes
socially e¢ cient behavior. In our analysis, this is simply the e¢ cient level
of care of the standard economic model of accidents. Secondly, the explicit
monetary incentives that we consider stem from the legal rules known to be
e¢ cient in the standard model where individuals have no normative concerns.
Finally, the normative concerns that we consider have a natural role to play
in the context of accidental harm.
We share with a recent strand of the literature, notably Bénabou and
Tirole (2006), the idea that an individuals actions may signal something
about his moral type.4 In our analysis, moral type refers to the extent
to which one adheres to the social norm. Various actions or their conse-
quences conceivably constitute signals about ones moral type: whether or
not the individual engages in an activity that may cause harm; if he does,
the extent to which he takes precautions to prevent harm; if precautions are
not directly observable, the mere occurrence of harm may suggest low care,
thereby indirectly signalling moral type; when harm is caused, the injurer
could also go so far as to spontaneously compensate the victim. We assume,
however, that preferences are such that moral and reputational concerns are
not strong enough for injurers to willingly compensate their victims.5 This
3For instance Bohnet et al. (2001), Lazzarini et al. (2004) and Zasu (2007).
4Signaling models in a similar vein are found in Bernheim (1994), Corneo (1997) and,
closer to to Bénabou and Tiroles framework, Daughety and Reinganum (2009). The basic
idea has of course often been expressed informally. See also Sen (1975) for interesting
insights.
5This is not to deny that spontaneous compensation is often oberved. To quote the
otherAdam Smith: The person...who...has involuntary hurt another...naturally runs up
to the su¤erer to express his concern for what has happened. If he has any sensibility, he
necessarily desires to compensate the damage.(Smith, 1790 [1976], p. 104).
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means that our individuals are only imperfectlymorally concerned; in addi-
tion, their desire for social esteem is not strong enough for them to attempt
to be perceived as perfectlymoral.
Three environments are considered: no-liability, perfectly enforced legal
liability (either strict liability or the negligence rule) and imperfectly en-
forced legal liability. Absent legal liability, normative concerns induce some
care to prevent harm but the precaution levels are then socially ine¢ cient.
By contrast, perfectly enforced legal liability crowds out informal incentives
completely  e.g., individuals who caused harm su¤er no social disapproval
 but precautions are then socially e¢ cient. Under imperfectly enforced le-
gal liability (e.g., victims do not always sue), however, formal legal sanctions
and normative concerns are complements and interact to induce more precau-
tions than under no-liability. Although there is motivational crowding-out,
there is no net crowding-out with respect to overall incentives. We complete
the analysis with a welfare comparison of the di¤erent legal regimes  no-
liability, strict liability, and the negligence rule. In particular, we discuss
the extent to which the legal rules are consistent with the underlying social
norm.
Section 2 presents the basic setup. The sections 3 and 4 discuss respec-
tively the no-liability and liability regimes. Section 5 presents the welfare
comparison. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Our starting point is the unilateral accident model of the law and economics
literature. Some individuals, hereafter injurers, have access to an activity
that provides a private benet to themselves but imposes a risk of harm to
others. Precautions reduce this risk but are costly. Given risk neutrality,
the socially optimal precautions minimize the sum of precaution costs to the
injurer and of the expected harm to victims. Absent legal liability, however,
injurers would disregard the negative externality they generate.6
6See Shavell (2007) for a recent survey. In Shavells terminology, injurers and victims
are strangers to one another, which rules out contractual agreements to prevent or
3
Setup. We depart from the basic model by introducing normative mo-
tivations. Society holds that harming others should be avoided; if one nev-
ertheless causes harm, one should compensate the victim. To some extent,
this social norm is internalized through intrinsic moral concerns: individu-
als su¤er moral disutility (e.g., guilt) if they do not comply with the social
norm. Moreover, those thought to have weak moral concerns are met with
disapproval. If ones actions suggest a disregard for the social norm, the
fear of social disapproval may then provide incentives. We refer to the latter
source of incentives as reputational concerns. Both moral and reputational
concerns constitute normative motivations in the sense that they derive from
ones allegiance to the social norm or ones attempt to signal allegiance to
the norm.
In our version of the unilateral accident model, an injurer is concerned
with his own material payo¤, with compliance with the social norm and with
social esteem. His utility function is
U(y; x; ; s; ) = y   x+ s: (1)
The rst term, y, is the injurers pecuniary payo¤; the second term, x, is
moral disutility; the third, s, is the utility from social esteem.
Moral disutility arises from not complying with the social norm, i.e., one
has caused harm and has not compensated the harm: x is the amount of
harm,  2 f0; 1g is the action of compensating ( = 0) versus not compen-
sating ( = 1) and  is a parameter that captures the degree to which the
individual adheres to the social norm. When the individual is responsible for
uncompensated harm, the moral disutility is greater the greater the severity
of the harm and the more one is morally concerned. The larger , the more
is the individual willing to sacrice private gain in order to comply with the
social norm. Perfect adherence to the social norm would correspond to  = 1.
The perfect individual would in e¤ect treat harm caused to others as his
own and would always be willing to compensate.7
mitigate harm.
7Compliance with the social norm requires full compensation and injurers are assumed
to have su¢ cient wealth to comply.
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An individuals  is private information and will be referred to as his type.
Social esteem depends on ones perceived type or social image s. This will
depend on what information is publicly available about the individual and
may well di¤er from the individuals true moral type. Someone thought to
care much about harming others earns social approval which provides utility,
i.e., the parameter  is positive.
The risk generating activity produces a private benet of amount b and
imposes on others a loss of amount L with probability p. The probability
of accident depends on the injurers precautions. To economize on notation,
we use the probability of accident itself to describe precautionary behavior.
A smaller p means more precautions. The cost of precautions is c(p) with
c0 < 0 and c00 > 0. At the boundaries, c(1) = c0(1) = 0 and c0(0) =  1,
i.e., the marginal precaution cost is nil at the no-precaution level p = 1 but
totally eliminating the risk of harm is prohibitively costly. The net income
of a potential injurer who does not engage in the activity is normalized to
zero.
In the standard model,  and  are zero. Absent legal liability, an injurers
utility is then U = b c(p) and is maximized by taking no precautions. Social
welfare, on the other hand, takes into account the loss su¤ered by victims
and is therefore W = b  c(p)  pL. The socially e¢ cient precaution level p
minimizes c(p)+ pL, the sum of precaution and expected accident costs. We
will also refer to p as the e¢ cient precaution level; its welfare signicance
when injurers have moral and reputational concerns is discussed further in
section 5. In the standard model, it is socially e¢ cient for potential injurers to
engage in the risk generating activity ifW = b c(p) pL > 0. To simplify,
the gross benet b is taken to be su¢ ciently large that exercising the activity
is always socially warranted, even when injurers take no precautions. Thus,
we assume b > L.
For future use, let
h(k) = argmin
p
c(p) + kp; where k  0:
It is easily seen that h(k) > 0 and is strictly decreasing, with h(0) = 1. In
terms of this function, the socially e¢ cient precaution level is p = h(L).
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No spontaneous compensation. All injurers care equally about social
esteem, i.e., they have the same parameter  > 0. The parameter  is
distributed according to the density f() with support [0; m] and mean value
denoted by . We impose the restriction:
Assumption 1: m < L=( + L):
The condition denes an upper bound on the extent to which preferences
depart from that of the standard model. Injurers put some weight on comply-
ing with the social norm, but they put greater weight on their own material
payo¤, i.e.,  < 1 for all types. Moreover, their moral concerns and their
desire for social esteem cannot simultaneously be too large. This rules out
some forms of signaling behavior.
To see this, suppose that causing harm is public information and that
there is no legal liability. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent injurers
from willingly compensating their victims. They will not do so on purely
moral grounds because the bad feelingsfrom not complying with the social
norm is less painful to them than the money cost of compensating. But the
action of compensating ones victim could provide a su¢ cient reputational
benet to make it worthwhile.
Let y be the injurers ex post payo¤ and suppose harm has been caused.
If a type- injurer does not compensate (action 1),  = 1 in (1) and the
individuals utility is U1 = y   L+ 1 where 1 is the social image (or up-
dated expected type) of injurers who do not compensate. If he compensates
(action 0),  = 0, i.e., the individual eliminates the moral disutility from
not complying with the social norm. Because he thereby also transfers the
victims loss to himself, his utility is U0 = y   L+ 0 where 0 is the social
image of injurers who compensate. The injurer will choose not to compensate
his victim if U0 < U1, that is if
 (0   1) < (1  )L: (2)
The posterior beliefs about ones type must belong to the interval [0; m], so
that 0 1  m. Assumption 1, which can be rewritten as m < (1 m)L,
implies that (2) always holds. Thus, we have:
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Lemma 1 At equilibrium, injurers do not voluntarily compensate their vic-
tims.
Although our injurers di¤er from standard homo economicus, they behave
the same following the occurrence of harm. By contrast, if injurers were to
voluntarily compensate their victims, they would impose upon themselves
the same penalties as under the strict liability legal regime. Anticipating
this, they would therefore exert the same care to prevent harm as under
strict liability.8
Assumption 1 also ensures that all types of potential injurers engage in
the risk generating activity. Suppose that whether or not one is engaged
in the activity is public information. If a type- injurer does not engage in
the activity, his net income is zero and he inicts no harm. His utility is
U0 = 0 where 0 is now the perceived type of those who do not engage.
For simplicity, suppose that those who engage take no precautions so that
they always cause harm (i.e., p = 1 and precaution costs are zero). Because
he does not compensate, the type- injurer has utility U1 = b   L + 1
where 1 is the perceived type of those who engage. Given b > L,
U1 = b  L+ 1 > (1  )L+ 1 > 0 = U0;
where the second inequality is the same as (2). Hence, all types engage. The
argument extends to the case where those who engage prefer to take some
precautions (see section 3).
Under a tort regime, an injurer may be legally obligated to compensate
the victim. We take it that forced compensation has the same e¤ect on moral
disutility as if it had been voluntary. When compensation is made, albeit
unwillingly, an injurer feels he has complied with the social norm.
8In the absence of further restrictions on the distribution of types, assumption 1 is
necessary to rule out voluntary compensation. For instance, suppose there are only two
types,  = 0 and  = m and that assumption 1 does not hold. If m < L, there exists
a separating equilibrium (with 0 = m and 1 = 0) where the high type voluntarily
compensates and the low type does not. If m > L and the proportion of high types is
su¢ ciently large, there exists a pooling equilibrium where both types compensate.
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Posterior information. Throughout the paper, with a qualication
in the case of negligence based liability, an injurers precautions are private
information. Precautions can a¤ect ones reputation only through the occur-
rence (or non occurrence) of harm. This is in line with the view that tort
law is an ex post harm-based mechanism for deterring undesirable behavior,
by contrast with an ex ante act-based approach as with safety regulations.9
When the tort regime is negligence, we will assume that some evidence about
the injurers precautions becomes available following the occurrence of harm
and that courts are able to assess whether the injurer complied with the legal
due care standard.
In our basic scenario, ex post public information about an injurer will
take the form of a binary signal with outcome B or G. The notation is B
for bad news(i.e., unfavorable information) and G for good news. The
interpretation of these events will depend on the context. For instance, B
may be injurer has caused harmor injurer has caused harm and has been
found negligent (hence is held legally liable under a negligence rule).
The probability of these events depends on the injurers precautions; we
denote with '(p) the probability of B. The injurers perceived type will be
conditional on whether B or G occurred. Denoting societys posterior beliefs
about ones type by B and G, an injurers expected perceived type, as a
function of his precaution level, is
s(p) = '(p)B + (1  '(p))G:
A general formulation for the expected utility of a type- injurer is then
U = y(p)  x(p) +  ['(p)B + (1  '(p))G] ; (3)
where y(p) is the injurers expected material payo¤ and x(p) is the expected
uncompensated harm for which he will be morally responsible. The expec-
tations are written as a function of the injurers precautions. Expectations
9On the distinction between harm-based and act-based deterrence, see Shavell (1993).
In a related context, Daughety and Reinganum (2009) analyze the e¤ect of privacy versus
publicity about ones actions.
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depend on the legal regime because it determines whether it is the victim or
the injurer who ultimately bears the accidental loss.
Societys posterior beliefs are part of an equilibrium. The requirements
are as follows.
Definition 1: Let the injurers expected utility be as in (3). A perfect
Bayesian equilibrium consists of strategies pe() and of beliefs eB and 
e
G
such that
(i) pe()maximizes U = y(p) x(p)+['(p)eB+(1 '(p))eG],  2 [0; m];
(ii) if 'B 
R m
0
'(p())f() d > 0, then
eB =
R m
0
'(p())f() d
'B
: (4)
(iii) if 1  'B > 0,
eG =
R m
0
[1  '(p())]f() d
1  'B
; (5)
Beliefs satisfy Bayesian up-dating when the conditioning events have pos-
itive probability over the population of injurers. When a conditioning event
has zero probability (e.g., when bad news never occur), the posterior belief
is to some extent arbitrary, but must be consistent with (i.e., support) the
equilibrium strategies.
Of particular interest is   eG   eB, the gap in social image between
good and bad news, which we will refer to as the reputational penalty. When
both B and G have positive probability, (5) and (4) can be combined to yield
 =  
R m
0
['(pe())  'B]f() d
'B(1  'B)
: (6)
The integral in the numerator is the covariance between  and '(pe()), a
negative quantity when '(pe()) is decreasing in . Reputational concerns
will provide incentives through the reputational penalty attached to bad
news.
While injurers are not willing to compensate their victims ex post, they
will want to take precautions ex ante to prevent the occurrence of harm. We
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rst consider the case where harm is not subject to legal liability. Incentives
to take precautions then rely purely on moral and reputational concerns.
Next, we introduce legal liability and examine how this combines with infor-
mal incentives.
3 No Liability
Causing harm often does not trigger legal liability. For instance, the harm
is not subject to judicial sanction because it is trivial or part of the usual
risks of life. Even when legal liability applies in principle, victims do not
necessarily le suit. Judicial procedures may be too expensive compared to
the stakes or there may not be enough evidence. Moreover, injurers are not
always detected, e.g., damages to ones car in a parking lot.
No publicity benchmark. We start with the case where an injurer
causing harm is never detected. Perhaps the victim knows the injurer, but
this is not public information. Alternatively, the occurrence of harm is
commonly observable but the identity of the injurer is unknown. In either
case, there is no public information about the injurers involvement in causing
harm.
A type  injurer then chooses his precaution level p to maximize
U = b  c(p)  pL+ ;
where  is the prior mean of types in the population. Because no information
about the injurer is made public, his social image is given by the prior mean.
Using the function dened in the previous section, the type- injurer chooses
p = h(L). This is greater than the e¢ cient p but less than unity: some
precautions are taken because of moral concerns. Let pM denote the average
probability of harm in the no-publicity environment.10
Publicity. Consider now the case where the occurrence of harm and the
causal relation to the injurer can become public information. Specically,
10That is, pM =
R m
0
h(L)f() d.
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suppose that, following an accident, the injurers involvement is publicly
known with probability q > 0.
Denote by B the event an occurrence of harm is ascribed to the injurer.
In other words, an accident has occurred and the injurers involvement is
common knowledge. In terms of the notation of the previous section, event
B has probability '(p) = pq. The event G is no occurrence of harm is
ascribed to the injurer, meaning that there is no information concerning
the injurers involvement in an accident. This event has probability
1  p+ p(1  q) = 1  pq:
Either harm has not occurred or it has occurred but has not been observed
by society at large or has been observed but not related to the particular
injurer.
The expected utility of a type- injurer is now
U = b  c(p)  pL+ [pqB + (1  pq)G]: (7)
This can be rewritten as
U = b+ G   c(p)  p(L+ q); where   G   B: (8)
In equilibrium, as shown below, societys beliefs will satisfy B <  < G. An
injurer is stigmatized by event B while event G provides social esteem. Given
the reputational penalty, the best-response function of a type- individual is
pZ(;) = h(L+ q); (9)
where the subscript stands for zero liability. Compared to the no publicity
case, reputational concerns now provide incentives.
Next we look for the equilibrium reputational penalty. It is obtained by
substituting the injurersbest response functions (9) in lieu of pe() in the
right-hand side of (6) and solving the resulting equation for . Recalling
that '(p) = qp, dene
 Z()   
R m
0
[pZ(;)  pZ()]f() d
pZ() (1  qpZ())
; (10)
where pZ() is the average best response over all types. At equilibrium,
 =  Z().
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Lemma 2 Any solution to  =  Z() belongs to (0; m) and there is at
least one satisfying  0Z() < 1.
The condition  0Z() < 1 characterizes a stable equilibrium. To see this,
write s =  Z(), where s is the reputational penalty consistent with
the injurersbehavior and  is the penalty anticipated by injurers, perhaps
erroneously. The anticipated penalty determines the injurersprecautions;
in turn, the injurersbehavior determines societys posterior beliefs, which
yields s. At equilibrium s = . Suppose now that the penalty antici-
pated by injurers receives a small positive shock. Injurers will increase their
precautions, which will change societys beliefs contingent on the events good
or bad news. When  0Z()  1, a new equilibrium will be reached where pre-
cautions remain higher than before the shock even after injurers have learned
societys true beliefs.
-- Figure 1 about here --
We discard unstable equilibria, should they exist (as with point Q in
gure 1). There remains the possibility that there is more than one stable
equilibrium (say, E1 and E2 in the gure). While this raises interesting
issues, it is not our main concern. In what follows, we loosely refer to the
equilibrium; should there be multiple equilibria, we focus on the one with the
largest reputational penalty.11 The next proposition summarizes our results
for the no-liability regime.
Proposition 1 Under no-liability, individuals known to have caused harm
are stigmatized and both moral and reputational concerns mitigate careless-
ness. All injurers exert less care than the socially e¢ cient level. They exert
greater care the more likely the publicity about involvement in causing harm.
From (9), reputational incentives depend on the probability of publicity
times the reputational penalty. The reputational penalty is itself a function
11It is well kown that social interaction models may exhibit multiple equilibria. See for
instance Rasmusen (1996), Glaeser et al. (1996) or Bénabou and Tirole (2006).
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of the probability of publicity and can be written as (q). The proposition
therefore states that q(q) is increasing in q.12 Nevertheless, moral and
reputational concerns are never strong enough to induce e¢ cient care, even
when causing harm is always detected.
A greater likelihood of publicity need not increase the reputational penalty
itself. One can show that (q) is locally decreasing when  0Z is negative and
increasing when the sign is positive (as at E1 and E2 in gure 1). The
e¤ect of greater publicity on the reputational penalty depends on whether
precautions are strategic substitutes or complements. In particular, precau-
tions are strategic substitutes when accidents occur often and injurers are
detected with su¢ ciently high probability. A greater probability of detec-
tion then means that bad news become even more banal. This reduces the
reputational penalty, which is not to say that incentives to exert care are
reduced.13
4 Liability
The tort rules are strict liability and negligence. Under a strict liability
regime, injurers are liable for full compensatory damages irrespective of the
precautions they have taken. Victims only need to prove causation. Under
a negligence regime, they also need to prove the injurers carelessness, i.e.,
that precautions did not meet the legal due care standard.14
We assume that a lawsuit imposes a small cost on plainti¤s, so that they
sue only if it is worthwhile, but we otherwise disregard litigation costs. Non
negligible litigation costs would impact on the socially e¢ cient precaution
12This comparative static result obtains only at stable equilibria.
13Klement and Harel (2007) point out some limitations to the usefulness of stigma as
a tool in crime prevention, e.g., in the context of shaming penalties. In their analysis,
stigmatization e¤ects may decrease as more crime are detected, so that deterrence may
be reduced. See also Rasmusen (1996). In our analysis, the e¤ect of greater publicity on
the reputational penalty can go either way because it depends on the inferences drawn at
equilibrium about an injurers type; however, it cannot decrease to the point that better
detection would reduce deterrence.
14Fault or negligence is the usual basis of liability.
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level, an issue we want to abstract from (see Shavell, 2007). They would
also give incentives to settle before trial. Even without such costs, however,
injurers could favor condential settlements  possibly allowing victims to
extract hush money if stigmatization e¤ects can thereby be avoided.15
There are also many possibilities regarding what information is publicly avail-
able. For example, involvement in causing harm may be public information
irrespective of lawsuits; alternatively, it may become known only if victims
le suit or if causation is proved at trial. When causing harm is public infor-
mation and no suit is led, it may or may not be known whether victim and
injurer reached an agreement; perhaps the victim did not pursue the mat-
ter because he did not possess su¢ cient evidence to prove negligence, which
does not necessarily mean that the injurer actually complied with due care.
For simplicity, we consider a litigation subgame where ex post public infor-
mation e¤ectively reduces to a binary outcome, as in the previous section.
Extensions are discussed as we go on.
The setup is as follows. The occurrence of harm and the identity of the
injurer are initially known only to the victim. The victim as plainti¤ has the
burden of proof if the case goes to trial. Following the occurrence of harm, a
victim knows for sure whether he has su¢ cient evidence to succeed in court
or whether he does not; this is common knowledge between the parties.
Under the strict liability rule, either the victim has evidence demonstrating
causation or he has no evidence at all. Under the negligence rule, the evidence
comes in a bundle: if harm occurred and the injurer did not comply with
due care, either the victim has evidence demonstrating this or he has no
evidence whatsoever; in all other cases, the victim has nothing to show.
Finally, secret settlements are not feasible: if payment has been extracted
from an injurer, information is always leaked and it becomes publicly known
that an agreement was reached. The ling of a lawsuit is public information.
The outcome at trial, i.e., whether or not the defendant is held liable, is of
course also public information.
15Condential settlements by producers, to avoid sequential suits when there are many
potential plainti¤s or to exploit consumer ignorance about the safety of a product, have
been extensively analyzed by Daughety and Reinganum (1999, 2002, 2005).
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In this simple framework, victims with a non viable case do nothing. Vic-
tims with a viable case le suit and pursue the case up to trial; equivalently,
they settle for the amount of damages they would have obtained in court.
In either case, the reputational e¤ect on the injurer is the same. An out-of-
court settlement imposes the same reputational penalty because settlements
are common knowledge and the injurer would not have o¤ered payment if
the victim had no evidence; since the reputational penalty is the same, the
injurer will not pay more than the damages he would have paid if the case
had gone to trial (and the victim would not accept less). Conversely, if the
victim does not have a viable case, ling suit is not worth the small ling
cost: the case would not succeed in court and no settlement will be forth-
coming, which in either case demonstrates that the plainti¤ had nothing to
show when he led suit.
Perfectly enforced legal rules. Perfect enforcement corresponds to
the elementary version of the economic model of torts. Under strict liability,
the occurrence of harm and causation (hence the identity of the injurer)
can always be proved and victims always sue. Injurers therefore know that,
should they cause harm, they will have to pay compensatory damages. Ones
involvement in causing harm is then always public information.
The bad news event B is injurer was sued, hence must have caused harm,
and was (or would have been) found liable. This has probability p. The
complementary event G is injurer was not sued, hence did not cause harm.
Injurers are forced to compensate their victim. Hence, although unwillingly,
they comply with the underlying social norm. As a result, they su¤er no
moral disutility but bear the victimslosses. The expected utility of a type-
injurer is therefore
U = b  c(p)  pL+ [pB + (1  p)G]:
Expected utility does not depend on the injurerstype and best responses are
therefore type independent. It follows (see denition 1) that the events G and
B do not provide information about type, i.e., at equilibrium eB = 
e
G = .
There is no reputational penalty from causing harm and all injurers choose
the precaution level p minimizing c(p) + pL.
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Consider now the negligence rule. As in the standard model, the legal
due care is taken to be the socially e¢ cient level of precaution. An injurer is
found negligent if the evidence shows that his precautionary behavior entailed
p > p. Under perfect enforcement, the victim always has access to such
evidence. Hence, injurers who do not comply with due care and cause harm
always compensate their victims and this is publicly known. Should the case
go to trial, we assume that the general public does not learn the actual level
of care of an injurer found negligent; it only knows that precautions did
not satisfy due care. For instance, the general public only pays attention to
the trial outcome and has no time for the details; equivalently, the evidence
submitted in court is crudeand allows only to prove that p > p. Thus,
the bad news event B is injurer has been sued and was (or would have been)
found negligent. Event G is the complementary event injurer has not been
sued, which means that either the injurer was not involved in causing harm
or that he caused harm but complied with due care.
A type- injurer now has the expected utility
U =

b  c(p)  pL+ G if p  p;
b  c(p)  pL+ [pB + (1  p)G] if p > p: (11)
The upper branch with p  p is the expected utility when the precaution
level satises due care. With probability one, the injurers social image will
then be G. With probability p, the injurer will nevertheless cause noncom-
pensated harm, which yields moral disutility. The lower branch with p > p
is for an injurer who does not comply with due care. With probability 1  p,
harm will not occur and the social image will again be G. With probability
p, the injurer will be sued and will pay damages L. He then su¤ers no moral
disutility from having caused harm, but his social image is B.
Consider rst the injurers best precaution level consistent with meeting
the due care standard. Because c(p)+ pL is strictly convex and is minimized
at p,
dU
dp
=   c0(p)  L >   c0(p)  L  0, for all p  p.
Thus, precautions will never exceed due care. For precaution levels that do
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not satisfy due care, and supposing that B  G,
dU
dp
=   c0(p)  L  (G   B) < 0, for all p > p.
Combining both results, the utility maximizing precaution level is therefore
p, so that the injurer will never be found negligent. Note the discontinuity
in the injurers payo¤when he decides to barely comply with due care rather
than not comply (see gure 2).
-- Figure 2 about here --
Let '(p) = 0 if p  p and '(p) = p if p > p. The expected utility in
(11) can then be rewritten as
U = b  c(p)  '(p)L  (p  '(p))L+ ['(p)B + (1  '(p))G]; (12)
so that denition 1 can be applied directly. Because all injurers exercise due
care, eG = . The bad news event B never occurs, so that B is an out-of-
equilibrium belief. From the above argument, any B  eG =  supports
the equilibrium. The next proposition summarizes our results for perfectly
enforced legal liability.
Proposition 2 Suppose liability rules are perfectly enforced. Then, (i) un-
der strict liability all injurers exert e¢ cient care and injurers sued or found
liable su¤er no stigma; (ii) under the negligence rule with due care set at the
e¢ cient level, all injurers comply with due care and not having been sued or
found negligent confers no prestige. Under either rule, moral and reputational
concerns play no role in providing incentives to exercise care.
When formal legal sanctions are introduced and enforcement is perfect,
moral concerns either disappear (under strict liability) or are superuous (un-
der the negligence rule); reputational concerns play no role. Although there
is motivational crowding-out, there is no net crowding out e¤ect because all
injurers take more precautions than under no liability.16
16Our results also contrast with Cooter and Porat (2001) where the issue is whether
courts should deduct nonlegal sanctionsfrom legal damages to avoid overdeterrence.
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Our assumptions about the litigation subgame can be modied in many
respects without a¤ecting the result. For instance, it would not matter if
secret settlements were allowed. Neither does it matter if involvement in
causing harm is observed independently of lawsuits.
Imperfectly enforced strict liability. Victims now do not necessar-
ily le suit because they cannot always prove causation. Let k denote the
probability that, following the occurrence of harm, a victim has access to
su¢ cient evidence. Injurers then know that, should they cause harm, with
probability k they will pay damages and be known to have caused harm.
For a type- injurer, expected utility is
U = b  c(p)  pkL  p(1  k)L+ [pB + (1  pk)G];
The bad news event B, now with probability pk, has the same interpretation
as under perfect enforcement. The event G is injurer was not sued, hence
did not cause harm or caused harm but there was no evidence to prove it.
The best response function is
pS(;) = h[(k + (1  k))L+ k]; (13)
where the subscript stands for strict liability. An injurers precautions depend
on his type, provided the probability of enforcement k is less than unity. The
analysis is similar to that of no-liability. Being sued (and settling or being
held liable if the case goes to trial) now imposes a reputational penalty. The
equilibrium reputational penalty solves an equation such as (10) but with
pS() substituted for pZ().
A natural comparison is with no-liability for the same probability of pub-
licity about involvement in causing harm. From (9), a type- injurers incen-
tives to exert care under no-liability are given by L+qZ , where Z is the
equilibrium reputational penalty under no-liability. From (13), the injurers
incentives under strict liability are (k + (1  k))L+ qS, where S is the
equilibrium reputational penalty under strict liability. When k = q, moral
incentives are lower under strict liability because injurers will sometimes be
forced to pay damages, but this is more than compensated by the expected
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legal damages. However, reputational incentives are likely to be weaker, i.e.,
S may be smaller than Z .17 Legal liability has a greater e¤ect on the
incentives of injurers with low moral concerns (a small ) than on those with
strong moral concerns. If precautions become more alike between types, the
bad news-good news signal will be less informative about moral type. Over-
all, incentives to exert care are nevertheless greater under the strict liability
regime, as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 When strict liability is imperfectly enforced, injurers found
liable are stigmatized and both moral and reputational concerns mitigate care-
lessness. All injurers exert greater care than they would under no-liability
with the same (or a smaller) probability of observing involvement in causing
harm.
If under no-liability injurers are detectedwith probability q, one would
expect a move to a strict liability regime with negligible litigation costs to
yield a probability of enforcement at least as large, i.e., k  q. This seems
reasonable to the extent that the factors conducing to common knowledge
about involvement in causing harm under no-liability would also entail su¢ -
cient evidence to prove causation. The probability of enforcement k may be
strictly larger than q because victims have monetary incentives to go pub-
licunder a strict liability regime, which they do not under no-liability. Note
that it does not matter if involvement in causing harm can become public
information independently of lawsuits.
Two remarks are in order. First, by contrast with the result for no-
liability in proposition 1, the level of care under strict liability need not
be monotonically increasing in k. In other words, a small increase in the
probability of enforcement may reduce precautions, a form of marginal net
crowding out. The reason is that reputational incentives may be su¢ ciently
reduced.18
17In particular, the reputational penalty under strict liability tends to zero as q ap-
proaches unity, but remains strictly positive under no-liability.
18This e¤ect can arise only locally. Average precautions are of course globally
increasing in k. When k = 0, pS = pM , the no-publicity benchmark; when k = 1, pS = p
.
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Secondly, with high but less than perfect enforcement, some injurers may
well exert more care than the socially e¢ cient level. WriteS(k) for the equi-
librium reputational penalty in (13). Under perfect enforcement, S(1) = 0
and injurers exerts socially e¢ cient care. When k < 1, S(k) > 0. As k
is reduced from the perfect enforcement level, albeit not by too much, the
occurrence of harm becomes informative. The fear of stigmatization may
then more than compensate the decrease in formal incentives. The e¤ect of
a change in k in the neighborhood of perfect enforcement is
@pS(;S(k))
@k

k=1
= h0(L) ((1  )L+ 0S(1)) :
where 0S(1) < 0. Precautions are greater with slightly less than perfect
enforcement when the above expression is positive.19
Imperfectly enforced negligence rule. As before, due care is assumed
to be set at the socially e¢ cient precaution level. A victim now sues a
negligent injurer only with probability k. The bad news event B has the
same interpretation as with perfect enforcement. Event G is injurer did not
cause harm, or caused harm but complied with due care, or did not comply
but the victim could not prove it.
The expected utility of a type- injurer can be written as in (12) but with
'(p) = 0 if p  p, '(p) = kp if p > p. More explicitly,
U =

b  c(p)  pL+ G if p  p;
b  c(p)  p(k + (1  k))L+ [pkB + (1  pk)G] if p > p:
(14)
We rst seek to characterize the pattern of compliance with due care.
Write the expected utility in (14) as U(p; ) and dene
UC()  max
pp
U(p; ) = b  c(p)  pL+ G: (15)
This is the maximum utility level reached by a type- injurer who complies
with the legal due care standard. Similarly, let
UNC()  sup
p>p
U(p; ): (16)
19One can show that this can arise only if h() is su¢ ciently convex.
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This is the most an injurer can obtain when he does not comply. Finally, let
bp()   h[(k + (1  k))L+ k] if this is larger than p,
p otherwise.
(17)
It is then easily seen that
UNC() = b  c(bp())  bp()[(k + (1  k))L+ k] + G: (18)
When the condition in the top row of (17) holds, problem (16) has the
interiorsolution
bp() = h[(k + (1  k))L+ k] > p:
When the condition does not hold, the injurer wants to get as close as possible
to due care. The injurer chooses not to comply when UNC() > UC(). With
  0, this obviously can arise only when bp() > p.
Lemma 3 Let   0. If a type 0 injurer complies with due care, so does a
type 00  0.
Both UC() and UNC() are decreasing in . Either all injurers comply,
none does, or high types comply while low types do not, i.e., the curves cross
at most once as shown in gure 3 (see the proof). The threshold for the
latter case is denoted by b.
-- Figure 3 about here --
Next we derive two critical values for the probability of enforcement. In
the standard model without moral or reputational concerns, it is well known
that the negligence rule may yield e¢ cient care even when enforcement is
less than perfect.20 Let k2 be the solution to
b  c(p) = max
p
b  c(p)  kpL: (19)
20This contrasts with strict liability. The argument is usually made with respect to the
injurers judgment-proofness. The damages e¤ectively paid are then constrained by the
injurers wealth, but inducing rst-best precautions remains feasible provided the injurer
is not too poor (see Shavell, 1987). The reason is the discontinuity in the expected payo¤
when the injurer decides to barely comply (recall gure 2).
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When the probability of enforcement is k2, the injurer in the standard model
is just indi¤erent between complying and not complying with due care; p
solving the right-hand side is then greater than p. Clearly, k2 < 1 and
injurers strictly prefer exercising due care whenever k > k2. This will also
be the case in our setup.
Consider now an injurer who cares for his reputation but has no moral
concerns (i.e.,  = 0). Let k1 be the solution to
b  c(p) +  = max
p
b  c(p)  kpL+ (1  pk): (20)
The maximand on the right-hand side is the expected utility of the com-
pletely immoral typewho anticipates G =  if he is not found negligent
and B = 0 if he is. When the probability of enforcement is k1, he is just
indi¤erent between complying and not. Note that k1 < k2.
Proposition 4 Suppose the negligence rule with due care set at the e¢ cient
level is enforced with probability k > 0. Then all injurers exert more care
than under no-liability with the same (or a smaller) probability of publicity.
There exists k0 < k1 < k2 < 1 such that:
(i) When k  k2, the equilibrium is the same as under the perfectly enforced
negligence rule.
(ii) When k1  k < k2, all injurers also comply with due care and there is no
prestige from not having been found negligent. Moral concerns play no role,
but reputational concerns provide incentives to comply.
(iii) When k0  k < k1, there is a threshold b(k) such that injurers with
  b(k) comply with due care, injurers with  < b(k) do not. Moral and rep-
utational concerns inuence the decision to comply and, for non-compliers,
they mitigate carelessness.
(iv) When k < k0, all injurers take less than due care and the outcome is the
same as under strict liability with the same probability of enforcement.
Figure 4 provides an illustration. The heavily drawn curve denoted pN(k)
is the average probability of harm under the negligence regime as a function
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of the probability of enforcement. The other curves represent the average
probability of accident under strict liability and no-liability.
-- Figure 4 about here --
When the probability of enforcement is large, namely greater than k1, all
injurers exert due care, which amounts to a pooling equilibrium. Because
even the completely immoral type exercises due care, moral incentives play
no role in providing incentives. Moreover, eG = , i.e., injurers avoiding
liability earn no prestige. The belief B is for events that do not occur at
equilibrium. When k  k2, any B   supports the equilibrium, hence
reputational concerns then play no role either. However, when k < k2, the
equilibrium is supported only with B  B(k) < , where B(k) is an upper
bound that is increasing in the probability of enforcement. In particular,
B(k1) = 0. At the threshold k1, the unique out-of-equilibrium belief is
eB = 0. Injurers with  = 0 are then induced to comply with due care only
because of the threat of being seen as completely immoral if they are found
negligent. Thus, reputational concerns provide useful incentives.
When enforcement is smaller than k1, both moral and reputational in-
centives play a role. When k  k0, the more morally concerned types 
those with  above some threshold  comply with due care. Intuitively,
the more morally concerned the individual, the less costlyit is to comply.
Less morally concerned injurers do not exert due care. Nevertheless, their
carelessness is mitigated by both moral and reputational concerns, as under
an imperfectly enforced strict liability regime. Finally, when enforcement is
less than k0, no one complies so that the negligence rule has the same e¤ect
overall as strict liability.
Note that the pattern of equilibria would remain the same qualitatively
if involvement in causing harm were public information independently of
lawsuits. The event G would then be partioned into two events, say G1 and
G2, where G1 means did not cause harmand G2 means caused harm but
was not sued. When the tort rule is su¢ ciently well enforced for all injurers
to comply, the equilibrium beliefs are eG1 = 
e
G2
= . When not all injurers
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comply, it is straightforward to see that eG1 > , but whether G2 would be
good or bad news depends on the probability of enforcement.
5 Welfare
The di¤erent legal regimes (no-liability, strict liability and the negligence
rule) were compared in terms of how close the injurersprecautions were to p,
the e¢ cient precaution level of the standard model where injurers only care
about their pecuniary payo¤. When injurers have moral and reputational
concerns, however, it is not clear that p is still an appropriate target. We
now provide a welfare comparison in an explicit utilitarian framework.
We also discuss a related but more intricate issue. In our analysis, the
moral or social norm was exogenously given: one should care about harm
caused to others. We then examined how formal legal incentives interact with
moral (and the derived reputational) concerns to deter careless behavior. We
did not consider the degree to which the legal normwas consistent with or
di¤ered from the social norm, nor the possibility that the legal normcould
inuence the individualsmoral preferences.
Comparison. As shown in he previous sections, formal legal sanctions
may partially or totally crowd out informal incentives, although this does
not reduce overall incentives. The costs of enforcing formal sanctions would
therefore naturally bear on the comparison of legal regimes. Nevertheless,
we will continue to abstract from such costs.
For simplicity, suppose that injurers can also be victims; that is, they
can themselves su¤er harm caused by another agent. For instance, the risk
generating activity under consideration is an everyday activity which every-
one engages in.21 Let U j() be the expected utility of a type- injurer at
equilibrium as dened in the previous sections, where j = Z, S, N denotes
the legal regime. Because individuals are potentially both injurer and victim,
21Alternatively, one could have two classes of agents, potential victims and potential
injurers, and sum utility over both victims and injurers. The conclusions would be unaf-
fected.
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expected utility is now U j()   Dj where Dj is the expected loss that the
individual faces due to the actions of others, net of the legal damages that
may eventually be awarded. Total welfare is
Wj =
Z m
0
 
U j() Dj

f() d; j = Z; S;N:
Under no-liability, a victims harm is never compensated. Hence, DZ =
pZL where pZ is the average probability of accident at equilibrium. Under
strict liability enforced with probability k, an individual su¤ers harm caused
by others with probability pS, but is then compensated by legal damages
with probability k. Hence, DS = (1   k)pSL. Finally, under the negligence
rule enforced with probability k, an individual faces
DN =
Z m
0
[peN()  '(peN())]Lf() d;
where '(p) = 0 if p  p, '(p) = kp if p > p.
Summing the utilities over the whole population yields
WZ = b  pZL 
Z m
0
[c(peZ()) + p
e
Z()L] f() d + ;
WS = b  pSL 
Z m
0
[c(peS()) + (1  k)peS()L] f() d + ;
WN = b  pNL 
Z m
0
[c(peN()) + (p
e
N()  '(peN())L] f() d + :
On the right-hand side, the rst term is the gross benet from the risk
generating activity; the second term is the average accidental loss; the in-
tegral sums the precaution costs and the moral disutility from causing non
compensated harm; the last term is the average utility from social esteem.
Note that reputational benets and penalties cancel out (see also Bénabou
and Tirole, 2006).
It is instructive to compare the legal regimes for the case where q  k = 1.
Under no-liability, individuals exert less than e¢ cient care. Under either
strict liability or negligence, all individuals exert the precaution level p.
Substituting in the above expressions then yields
WS = b  pL  c(p) +   W ; (21)
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WN = b  pL  c(p)  pL+  = W    pL: (22)
Under strict liability, individuals bear accidental harm as injurers but not
as victims. Under the negligence rule, it is the opposite since no one is found
negligent. Under this rule, however, individuals also su¤er moral disutility
from inicting non compensated harm. It is clear that welfare cannot be
greater than W  as dened in (21): the sum of precaution and accident
costs cannot be made smaller and individuals su¤er no moral disutility from
causing harm.
Corollary 1 When q  k = 1, WZ < WN < WS.
Strict liability yields greater welfare because it forces injurers to com-
pensate their victims, thereby eliminating the moral disutility from causing
harm. It is as if strict liability forced injurers to purchase a clear conscience,
something they would not do spontaneously. Under negligence, by contrast,
both victims and injurers su¤er from the occurrence of harm, hence welfare is
smaller. Finally, welfare is greater under negligence than under no-liability
because average wealth is larger and because the moral cost of imposing
non compensated harm is smaller; both results follow from the fact that
peZ() > p
 for all types.
When enforcement is imperfect, the welfare comparison is not as straight-
forward, although some results emerge easily. For instance, suppose all in-
dividuals are underdeterred under strict liability. Applying proposition 2,
pZ() > pS() > p
 for all  and it is readily seen that WZ < WS. Sim-
ilarly, WZ < WN . It is not clear, however, how negligence compares with
strict liability with the same probability of enforcement. Suppose k  k1
as dened in proposition 4. Under negligence, all individuals then exercise
e¢ cient care. Wealth is therefore greater under negligence than under strict
liability. On the other hand, the average moral disutility could be smaller
under strict liability.
Legal versus social norms. In the above analysis, legal liability re-
duced to a pure system of external penalties contingent on some evidence.
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These penalties determined the priceof carelessness but they had no sym-
bolic signicance and expressed no values. We now inquire about the values
underlying legal liability.
The social norm we postulated was that harming others should be avoided
and that one should compensate for the harm that one does cause. Perfect
conformity with this social norm would arise with  = 1. In a less than
ideal world, perfectindividuals do not exist. However, strict legal liability
can in principle (when enforcement is perfect) induce individuals to behave
in perfect conformity with the social norm. Thus, one could say that strict
liability expressesperfectly the underlying social norm.
This is not so with the negligence rule we considered. Under this rule,
the connotation is that there is no legal wrongdoingwhen harm occurs
but the injurers actions conformed to the legal due care standard. In our
analysis, moral values were una¤ected by the legal norm; the individuals
conception of moral wrongdoingremained based solely on the preexisting
social norm that one should not cause uncompensated harm. As a result,
morally concerned individuals su¤er disutility from causing harm even if they
are not legally culpable. Note that this e¤ect would not arise if individuals
were perfect. If all were characterized by  = 1, injurers would always
spontaneously compensate their victims even when there is no legal obligation
to do so and all would exercise due care, i.e., average welfare would be W 
irrespective of the quality of enforcement.
According to the expressive theory of law, legal rules have normative
power in the sense that they a¤ect behavior not only by shaping the material
payo¤s, but also by directly inuencing peoples motives. If law expresses
values or has social meaning, it could change the individualsperception of
the social norm.22 One possibility is that the legal norm of due care modies
the interpretation of wrongdoing, in the sense that individuals who comply
with the legal rule of conduct experience no moral disutility from causing
22On the expressive theory of law, see Kahan (1997) and Cooter (1998). Tyran and
Feld (2006) and Galbiati and Vertova (2007) discuss experiments on the direct behavioral
e¤ects of legal obligations, independently of sanctions. See also McAdams and Nadler
(2005).
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harm.
Specically, suppose again that due care under the negligence rule is p.
Because of the legal norm dened by due care, the individuals utility in (1)
is now
U = y   (p)x+ s;
where (p) = 0 if p  p (or if the individual compensates the harm he
caused) and (p) = 1 otherwise. Expected utility under the negligence rule
is as before except that  is replaced with (p). Summing over all types
then yields
WN = b pNL 
Z m
0
[c(peN()) + (p
e
N())(p
e
N()  '(peN())L] f() d+;
where peN() now denotes the equilibrium level of care of type  under the
new moral preferences. The equilibria under no-liability or strict liability
would of course remain the same.
Corollary 2 Suppose individuals have no moral concerns about causing un-
compensated harm when they comply with the legal due care standard un-
der the negligence rule. If due care is set at the e¢ cient precaution level
and k  k1 as dened in proposition 4, then all individuals comply and
WN = W
  WS, with strict inequality when k < 1.
Everything else equal, compared to the situation where moral preferences
are una¤ected by the legal norm, complying with due care is now more desir-
able when  > 0 and it remains the same when  = 0. Hence, the threshold
k1 for overall compliance remains unchanged. Welfare under the negligence
rule is now greater because moral concerns are in line with the legal norm of
conduct. Because the negligence rule has the potential to implement e¢ cient
care even when enforcement is imperfect, it can now dominate strict liability.
6 Concluding remarks
The social norm considered in this paper relates to the time-honored ethical
principle of the Silver Rule, often stated as Do not do to others as you would
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not have them do to you. Kant remarked that negativeduties (what he
termed perfect duties), such as the duties not to cheat, steal or harm others,
were in principle enforceable by law (see White, 1999a). In a well functioning
civil community (as opposed to an ethical one), individuals would follow their
perfect duties purely out of self-interest, i.e., to avoid sanctions. This is the
situation considered in the standard economic model of socially e¢ cient tort
rules. By contrast, legal enforcement would not be needed if the perfect
duties were followed out of ethical considerations.
It has often been argued that Kantian behaviorcan improve outcomes
in some situations, e.g., in public good problems. See La¤ont (1975) for
an earlier statement and Bilodeau and Gravel (2004) for a critical assess-
ment. White (2009b) makes the point (see also Wolfesperger, 1999) that
the usual interpretations of the categorical imperative in economics does not
distinguish between Kants perfect and imperfect duties. The latter require
a general positiveattitude, but prescribe no precise course of action, hence
may not su¢ ce for an e¢ cient outcome in complex situations. In the simple
accident model, however, overall allegiance to the negative moral duty not
to harm othersis su¢ cient for socially e¢ cient behavior.
We showed that moral concerns and legal sanctions are complements when
both of them are imperfect. Thus, if the substantive laws are e¢ cient but
imperfectly enforced, allegiance to the moral duty improves e¢ ciency, even
if allegiance is only imperfect. Conversely, if allegiance to the moral duty is
imperfect, appropriate legal rules also improve e¢ ciency, even if their enforce-
ment is imperfect. In particular, there is no net crowding-out of incentives
due to the introduction of formal sanctions. This contrasts with some analyt-
ical results in the literature, as well as with many empirical and experimental
observations.
Our no crowding-out result has a simple structure. First, we did not
consider an arbitrary set of moral preferences and monetary rewards. As
emphasized, in its perfect form, each set of incentives was on its own con-
ducive to e¢ ciency. Moreover, as discussed in the preceding section, there is
a deep a¢ nity between the two forms of incentives. Secondly, and crucially,
our result was derived under a parameter restriction that, in particular, re-
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duced the scope of reputational concerns. Net crowding-out can arise only
through the e¤ect on reputational incentives at equilibrium.
Absent our parameter restriction, there will be situations where some
individuals willingly compensate their victims under no-liability, i.e., these
individuals end up causing no harm (except to themselves) and will take
precautions as under perfectly enforced strict liability. Either this will be
true for all individuals or only for the more morally concerned types. In the
latter case, less morally concerned individuals know that, if they are seen as
having caused harm, the bad news signal will be caused harm and did not
compensate the victim. Net crowding-out could occur for these individuals
following the introduction of imperfectly enforced legal sanctions. Indeed,
one can provide examples where under no-liability some of these individuals
will exercise more than the e¢ cient level of care. Perfectly enforced strict
liability would then induce them to exercise no more than the e¢ cient level
of care, a net crowding-out result that in this case turns out to be socially
benecial.
One limitation of our analysis is that social interactions arise only through
reputational e¤ects, as in Bénabou and Tirole (2006). It may well be that
intrinsic motivationitself depends on ones perception of the extent to which
others adhere to the social norm, a form of reciprocity or conditional coop-
eration (see for instance Frey and Torgler, 2007). Similarly, the desire to
be perceived as virtuous presumably depends on the importance of virtue
to others. An interesting extension of the present analysis would therefore
be to incorporate this second channel of social interactions into the accident
model.
Appendix
Proof of lemma 2. From (9), the best responses pZ(;) are non zero
and strictly decreasing in . Hence, 0 < pZ() < 1, i.e., both B and G have
positive probabilities, and 0 <  Z() < m for all  2 [0; m] where  Z()
is a continuous function. Dening () =  Z()   , it follows that any
30
solution to () = 0 belongs to (0; m). Such a solution exists since (0) > 0,
(m) < m and () is continuous. Moreover, there must be one (e.g., the
one with the smallest ) at which the  Z() curve cuts the forty-ve degree
line from above, which is equivalent to  0Z() < 1 at the solution. QED
Proof of proposition 1. The rst claim follows directly from pZ(;) =
h(L+ q), given that  > 0 by lemma 2. We now turn to the two other
claims.
a) We rst show that pZ > p
. At equilibrium, pZ(;) = h(L + q)
where  < m by lemma 2. Because h is decreasing, for all types  2 [0; m],
h(L+q) > h(mL+m) > h(L) = p
, where the last inequality follows
from assumption 1.
b) To show that pZ is decreasing in q, substitute for the best responses
h(L + q) in (10) and write  Z explicitly as  Z(; q). Let x  q and
dene
 (x; q)   
R m
0
[h(L+ x)  h(x)]f() d
h(x)
 
1  qh(x)
where h(x) is the average best response over all types. Observe that  (x; q) 
 Z

x
q
; q

or equivalently  (q; q)   Z (; q) Condition (10) can then be
rewritten as
x = q (x; q); (23)
where x solving (23) is an equilibrium expected reputational penalty and
depends on q. Di¤erentiating totally with respect to q yields
dx
dq
=
 (x; q) + q q(x; q)
1  q x(x; q)
:
The numerator is positive since  (x; q) > 0 and the function is increasing
in q. The denominator is positive at a stable equilibrium since
q x(x; q) =
d (q; q)
d
 @ Z (; q)
@
< 1:
Hence, x(q)  q(q) is increasing in q, implying that all injurers exert more
e¤ort. QED
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Proof of proposition 3. We prove only the last claim. Incentives are
strictly greater under strict liability if
[k + (1  k)]L+ kS > L+ qZ
or equivalently
k(1  )L+ (kS   qZ) > 0:
With k  q,
k(1  )L+ (kS   qZ)  k [(1  )L+ (S  Z)]
> k [(1  m)L  m]
> 0:
The last inequality follows from assumption 1. The second-to-last from  
m and the fact that S, Z 2 (0; m). QED.
Proof of lemma 3. Let
()  UNC()  UC()
= c(p) + pL  c(bp())  bp() [(k + (1  k))L+ k] :
We show that () = 0 has at most one solution, say b, and that () > 0 if
 < b and ()  0 otherwise. Applying the envelope theorem,
 0() = pL  bp()(1  k))L
and therefore
 00() =   bp0()(1  k))L;
where bp0() < 0 when bp() > p and is zero when bp() = p. Hence,  00()  0,
implying that () is a convex function.
Let us extend the range of possible values for  to [0; 1] and look for
solutions in this interval. Because () is convex, it is either monotonic or
rst decreasing and then increasing. In the rst case, there is at most one
solution in the interval; in the second case, there can be at most two. Now,bp(1) = p so that   0 implies (1)  0, where the equality holds only
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if  = 0. Therefore, if there are two solutions, one must be  = 1 (when
 = 0), implying that there is at most one solution in [0; m]. In the latter
interval, a solution does not exist if () is everywhere increasing because in
that case (m) < 0. Otherwise, if a solution exists, it must be that () is
decreasing at the solution. QED
Proof of proposition 4. Part (i) follows from the argument in the text
and lemma 3. To show (ii), let k 2 [k1; k2] and dene
v(B; k)  max
p
b  c(p)  kpL+ [pkB + (1  pk)]; B  :
This is the expected utility of the complete egoist, if found liability with
probability k, when bad news yields B and good news yields . The function
is increasing in B and decreasing in k. Let B solve
v(B; k) = b  c(p) + ; (24)
where the right-hand side is the utility of complying when good news yields
. The complete egoist complies if B  B. From (19), B =  when k = k2.
From (20), B = 0 when k = k1. Expressed as a function of k, B(k) is
increasing and continuous. Thus, when k 2 [k1; k2), there is an upper bound
B(k) <  such that beliefs satisfying B  B(k) induce compliance when
 = 0; by lemma 3, such beliefs induce overall compliance.
When k < k1, equation (24) has no solution. In equilibrium some injurers
will therefore not comply and both B and G will have positive probability,
implying  2 (0; m). If some injurers comply, lemma 3 implies the existence
of a type threshold b(k) < m as stated in (iii). For k su¢ ciently close to
k1, an equilibrium with such a threshold necessarily exists. For k su¢ ciently
small, however, it does not. For instance, dene
u(k)  max
p
b  c(p)  p(k + m(1  k))L+ (1  pk)m:
This is the expected utility of the high type  = m, if found liability with
probability k, when bad news yields B = 0 and good news yields  = m,
i.e., the anticipated reputational penalty is  = m. The function is strictly
decreasing in k. Let kc be the solution to
u(kc) = b  c(p)  mpL+ m: (25)
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The right-hand side is the expected utility of the same injurer if he complies.
It is easily veried that (25) has a solution satisfying 0 < kc < k1. Because at
equilibrium we must in fact have  < m, even the high type  = m would
not comply when k  kc. Thus, there exists some k0, with kc < k0 < k1, as
stated in (iii) and (iv). QED
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